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ABSTRACT
Objective To evaluate the effect of financial incentives on
four clinical quality indicators common to pay for
performance plans in the United Kingdom and at Kaiser
Permanente in California.
Design Longitudinal analysis.
Setting 35 medical facilities of Kaiser Permanente
Northern California, 1997-2007.
Participants 2523659 adult members of Kaiser
Permanente Northern California.
Main outcomes measures Yearly assessment of patient
level glycaemic control (HbA1c <8%), screening for
diabetic retinopathy, control of hypertension (systolic
blood pressure <140 mm Hg), and screening for cervical
cancer.
Results Incentives for two indicators—screening for
diabetic retinopathy and for cervical cancer—were
removed during the study period. During the five
consecutive years when financial incentives were
attached to screening for diabetic retinopathy (1999-
2003), the rate rose from 84.9% to 88.1%. This was
followed by four years without incentives when the rate
fell year on year to 80.5%. During the two initial years
whenfinancialincentiveswereattachedtocervicalcancer
screening (1999-2000), the screening rate rose slightly,
from 77.4% to 78.0%. During the next five years when
financial incentives were removed, screening rates fell
yearonyearto74.3%.Incentiveswerethenreattachedfor
twoyears(2006-7)andscreeningratesbegantoincrease.
Across the 35 facilities, the removal of incentives was
associated with a decrease in performance of about 3%
per year on average for screening for diabetic retinopathy
and about 1.6% per year for cervical cancer screening.
Conclusion Policy makers and clinicians should be aware
that removing facility directed financial incentives from
clinical indicators may mean that performance levels
decline.
INTRODUCTION
Many countries now use quality indicators to measure
the standard of clinical care in both community and
hospitalsettings.Somealsoattachmonetarypayments
to the level of achievement, as measured by the
indicator,
1 since financial incentives have been shown
to lead to improvements in clinical quality.
23 In the
United Kingdom, the quality and outcomes pay for
performance framework was introduced into primary
carein2004.Itincludestheclinicalcareofpeoplewith
chronicdiseasessuchasdiabetes,organisationalissues
such as the management of medicines and summarisa-
tion of patients’ records, patients’ experienceof access
tocareandconsultationlength,andadditionalservices
such as screening for cervical cancer. Each indicator
has severalpointsattached to it, witheach point equat-
ing to a payment of £126.77 (€142.36; $192.02). Cur-
rently the most a primary care practice can score in a
yearis1000points.TheQualityandOutcomesFrame-
work costs the UK economy about £1bn each year.
Although quality indicators could remain indefi-
nitely within a pay for performance framework, this
would restrict the potential benefits of providing a
financial incentive to only a limited number of condi-
tions.Additionally,achievementlevelsfortheseincen-
tivisedindicatorscouldeventuallyreachaceiling,with
little furtherimprovementovertime.
4Therehas,how-
ever,beenlittleempiricalworkoneithertheunderpin-
ningprinciplestoguideremovalofindicatorsfrompay
forperformanceframeworksortheeffectsofremoving
afinancialincentiveondoctorperformanceandthere-
foreperhapsonpatientcare.Theinteractionsbetween
intrinsic motivation of doctors and extrinsic rewards
such as financial remuneration are complex.
56 It is
hard to know when or if incentivised behaviours
become so standard and routine that financial incen-
tives are superfluous.
Understanding the effects of removing indicators
has become a priority in the United Kingdom follow-
ing a policy decision to remove indicators from the
Quality and Outcomes Framework on a regular
basis.
78 Negotiations between the Department of
Health and general practitioner representatives in
autumn 2009 resulted in an agreement to remove
eight clinical indicators from the framework in April
2011.
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tives from clinical indicators on subsequent perfor-
mance. The hypothesis was that removing the
financial incentive would be associated with a subse-
quent decrease in performance levels compared with
levelsachievedwhileincentiveswereinplace.Nodata
on the removal of incentives for doctors for clinical
quality were available in the United Kingdom (only
three indicators have been removed from the Quality
and Outcomes Framework since its inception in 2004,
and achievement in those areas has not been routinely
monitored); however, data were available at Kaiser
Permanente in California where incentives directed
towards medical facilities, rather than individual doc-
tors, have been attached to several quality indicators
and later were removed from a few. We examined
four of the 20 prespecified indicators, choosing speci-
ficallythosecommontoboththeUKQualityandOut-
comes Framework and the Kaiser Permanente
Northern California: screening for cervical cancer,
control of hypertension, diabetes control, and screen-
ing for diabetic retinopathy. Financial incentives were
removed from two of these indicators during 1999 to
2007.
WithinKaiserPermanente,decisionstoapplyincen-
tives to specific performance indicators were moti-
vated by the potential clinical benefits to members,
the interests of employer purchasers, the indicators
used by external “report cards” and regulators, the
gap between current Kaiser Permanente performance
and high performing benchmarks, and the organisa-
tion’s “readiness” to change in a specific area. For
instance, the presence of an obvious means for chang-
ing performance and of accountable, committed
clinical leaders in an area would support use of an
incentive. Similarly, decisions to drop incentives for a
specific indicator would be motivated by changes in
these considerations such that other indicators
seemed to offer more population benefit or room for
improvement.
METHODS
The study population consisted of adult members of
Kaiser Permanente Northern California, an integrated
healthcare delivery system providing comprehensive
medical care to about 3.1 million people in northern
California. We included 2523659 adult patients
whoseprimary source of care was oneof 35 outpatient
facilities owned and operated by Kaiser Permanente
Northern California. Primary care is provided by gen-
eralinternistsandfamilypractitioners;specialtycareis
also provided at these facilities. To assess patient level
diabetes glycaemic control (HbA1c <8%), screening
status for diabetic retinopathy, hypertension control
(systolic blood pressure <140 mm Hg), and whether a
patient was up to date with cervical cancer screening
we used automated data on health plan membership,
diagnosesasinpatients and outpatients,radiology pro-
cedures, laboratory tests, and prescription drugs each
year between 1999 and 2007. Performance measures
based on these automated data have been found to be
highlyreliable.
9Weaggregatedthepatientleveldatato
produce quality indicators for each of the 35 medical
facilities within the Kaiser Permanente Northern Cali-
fornia region.
To assess glycaemic control, we examined the last
recorded HbA1c value for each adult member aged
18-75 who met one or more of the following criteria:
two or more outpatient visits with a diagnosis of dia-
betes in the past two years; one or more hospital dis-
charges with a principal diagnosis of diabetes in the
past two years; or at least one fill of a prescription for
a diabetes drug (including insulin and oral agents)
within the year before the assessment year. We
excluded members with a diagnosis of gestational dia-
betes within 12 months before the reporting period.
Members were considered to have glycaemic control
of if their most recent HbA1c value in the year was less
than 8%. Members who were not tested within the
reporting period were presumed to have poor glycae-
mic control.
In the same population we assessed screening for
diabetic retinopathy, restricted to members aged 31
or more (since the American Diabetes Association
and American Academy of Ophthalmology recom-
mend regular screening on diagnosis for patients
aged >30). Patients were considered to have been
screened if they recorded a visit to the optometry or
ophthalmology department within two years of the
end of the assessment year.
To assess rates of hypertension control, we exam-
ined the last recorded systolic blood pressure value in
each year from 2002-7 for members aged 20 or more
who met one or more of the following criteria for hav-
inghypertensionintheprevioustwoyears:hadatleast
one prescription for an antihypertensive drug plus an
outpatientdiagnosisof hypertension; had two or more
outpatient diagnoses of hypertension; had a prescrip-
tionforanantihypertensivedrugplusoneormoreele-
vated outpatient blood pressure readings (systolic
≥140 mm Hg or diastolic ≥90 mm Hg); or had at least
one outpatient diagnosis of hypertension plus at least
onereadingof≥140mmHgforsystolicbloodpressure
or ≥90 mm Hg for diastolic blood pressure. We
excluded years 1999-2001 because blood pressures
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Fig 1 | Control of hypertension (systolic blood pressure
<140 mm Hg) in relation to financial incentives in adults aged
≥20 (data only available from 2002)
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If the systolic blood pressure was <140 mm Hg we
considered hypertension to be controlled.
For cervical cancer screening rates, we considered
eligible for a cervical smear all women aged 21-64 at
thestartoftheassessmentyearwhowerecontinuously
enrolled for 34 of 36 previous months and had no evi-
dence of a total hysterectomy. Cervical smears are
recommended every three years in this age group in
theUnitedStates.Acervicalcancerscreenwasconsid-
ered to have been done for that member if there was
any record of a smear test in the laboratory database
within the 36 months before the end of the assessment
year.
Use of financial incentives
In each year from 1999-2007, the regional operations
leadership of Kaiser Permanente Northern California
offered financial incentives for achieving target goals
on a select list of clinical quality indicators. These
incentiveswereawardedtofacilitiesratherthanindivi-
dual doctors and could be used to fund core facility
operations, staffing, and quality improvement.
Although incentives were at an organisational level,
this created alignment of leadership and engagement
in performance improvement and also resulted in
major investments in redesign. Staff in turn appre-
ciated that incentives could mean greater revenue to
themedicalcentre.In2006,$42000000(£25169293;
€31120332) was awarded as incentives across the 35
facilities. If an incentive was removed, the money was
linked to performance on other indicators. The total
funds that could be earned by a facility were relatively
stableduringthisperiod,despitechangesintheindica-
tors that were incentivised.
Within Kaiser Permanente Northern California,
quality indicators are typically supported by a range
of interventions at system level.
10 This includes the
promotion of the quality goal by doctor champions;
funding of non-doctor staff to carry out outreach and
assist in management of the population; provision of
informationtechnologytoolssuchaspopulationtrack-
ing software and patient reminders; and development
and dissemination of clinical guidelines. These system
level supports may or may not remain if incentives are
removed. In the case of screening for cervical cancer,
for example, a “preventive health prompt” was in
place. At each visit a list was printed out of the preven-
tive measures that needed to be done—typically they
gave the last date the test had been done and the date
the next test was due—so the clinician could see what
was outstanding. In addition, performance on cervical
cancer screening continued to be measured and
reportedaspartoftheperformancereportstofacilities.
The list of indicators linked to financial incentives
varied during the study period. Decisions to remove
or add incentives were made by the leadership of Kai-
ser Permanente Northern California based on priori-
ties for the coming year. During the study period,
incentives were removed for screening for cervical
cancer and for diabetic retinopathy. In both cases,
rates were relatively high, incentives did not seem to
be leading to further increases, and it was thought that
there were better opportunities to improve care, such
asgreaterfocus oncardiovascularriskreduction. Doc-
tors and clinical staff at each facility were informed of
changes in the quality incentives.
Statistical analyses
For each of the four quality indicators we created a
financial incentive variable for each year from 1999-
2007: if a financial incentive was attached to a given
indicator in a year, the variable was “Y”; if not, the
variable was “N.”
We examined the annual regional performance for
each indicator in relation to whether a financial incen-
tive was in place, was not yet in place, or had been
removed. Financial incentives were removed for
screening for both diabetic retinopathy and cervical
cancer.Foreachoftheseindicatorsweranhierarchical
regression models separately to estimate the effect of
removing the incentive on year to year change in per-
formance.Ineachmodeltheunitofanalysiswasafacil-
ity during a year. The dependent variable was change
in performance (expressed in percentage points) from
the previousyear. Themain independent variablewas
whether the incentive was in place versus was
removed. We examined facility effects as random
effects and assumed the yearly change in scores to
have a first order autoregressive structure. Because
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Fig 2 | Glycaemic control (<8%) in relation to financial
incentives in adults aged 18-75
Year
%
 
s
c
r
e
e
n
e
d
2002 2003 2004 2005 1999 2000 2001 2006 2007
60
70
80
90
100
Incentive on
Incentive off
Fig 3 | Percentage of adults aged ≥31 screened for diabetic
retinopathy in relation to financial incentives
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simultaneously, we could not examine incentives as
fixed effects at facility level.
In sensitivity analyses, we fitted similar models with
alternative covariance structures. We also fitted mod-
elsthatfurtheradjustedforfixedfacilityeffects(suchas
the log of the number of people served by the facility).
These analyses yielded estimates of the impact of
removing the incentive that were similar to those in
main regression analyses. All models were run using
PROC MIXED in SAS v.9.2.
RESULTS
Control of hypertension was incentivised through the
period of interest, but automated data were only avail-
able from 2002. The proportion of adults with hyper-
tension whose systolic blood pressure was below
140 mm Hg increased from 58.3% in 2002 to 78.2%
in 2007 (fig 1).
Glycaemiccontrolwasnotincentivisedduring1999
and 2000 and levels of achievement were 44.2% and
46.8%, respectively (fig 2). After the introduction of
incentives in 2001, performance continued to
improve, with levels of achievement increasing most
years and reaching 69.8% in 2007 (fig 2).
During the study period incentives were removed
from screening for diabetic retinopathy and cervical
cancer screening. During the five consecutive years
when financial incentives were attached to screening
for diabetic retinopathy (1999-2003), the proportion
screened rose from 84.9% to 88.1% (fig 3). This was
followed by four years without incentives when the
proportion screened fell year on year to 80.5%.
During the initial two years when financial incen-
tives were attached for cervical cancer screening
(1999-2000), screening rates rose slightly from 77.4%
to 78.0% (fig 4). During the next five years when no
financial incentives were attached, rates fell year on
year to 74.3%. Incentives were then reattached for
two years (2006-7) and screening rates increased
again (fig 4).
Analyses of the year on year changes at facility level
suggest that after incentives were removed screening
for diabetic retinopathy declined on average by about
3% per year and for cervical cancer by an average of
1.6% per year. Regression analyses of the year on year
changes suggest that after incentives were removed,
screeningfordiabeticretinopathydeclinedonaverage
by about 3% per year (mean change 3.1%, 95% confi-
denceinterval2.4%to3.8%)andscreeningforcervical
cancerbyanaverageofabout2%peryear(mean1.6%,
confidence interval 1.1% to 2.1%).
DISCUSSION
Removal of system directed financial incentives for
two quality indicators (screening for diabetic retinopa-
thy and for cervical cancer) in Kaiser Permanente
NorthernCaliforniawasassociatedwithsmalldeclines
inperformancelevelsforthoseindicatorsinthefollow-
ing years.
This study addressed the relatively under-explored
butimportantareaoftheeffectoftheremovaloffinan-
cial incentives within health care on performance. If
removal of financial incentives means that perfor-
mance levels, and therefore potentially patient care,
decline, this may have direct practical implications
for policy makers, clinicians, and patients.
Strengths and limitations of the study
This study has additional limitations owing to differ-
ences between Kaiser Permanente Northern Califor-
nia and the UK National Health Service. Within
Kaiser Permanente Northern California, the payment
attached to each indicator is directed to its relatively
large medical care facilities rather than to individual
doctors, and doctors’ income is not affected by the
incentives. Furthermore, it is difficult to separate the
impact of financial incentives from that of other regio-
naleffortsdirectedtowardsthesamequalitymeasures.
In most instances, the organisation implements addi-
tionalstrategiesalongwithincentives,suchasdevelop-
ment of computerised reminders for doctors or
databases for direct outreach by non-doctor staff, and
in somecasesthesestrategiesare scaledbackwhenthe
incentives are removed. In the case of screening for
diabetic retinopathy, regionally generated reminder
lists to facilities were stopped at the time the incentive
waswithdrawnbut supportswere keptin placeforcer-
vical cancer screening.
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Fig 4 | Percentage of women aged 21-64 screened for cervical
cancer in relation to financial incentives
WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
Manyhealthcaresystemsnowattachfinancialincentivesto
clinical indicators
Financial incentives can lead to improvement in clinical
performance in a primary care setting
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
Removal of financial incentives for two quality indicators
was associated with small declines in performance levels
Policymakersandcliniciansneedtobeawarethatremoving
financial incentives from clinical indicators may mean that
recorded performance levels, and therefore potentially
patient care, may decline over time
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primary care practices and directly affects doctors’
income. Although many practices do implement re-
mindersorother“systemsolutions”toimproveperfor-
mance on incentivised tasks, little other systemwide
supportexiststohelpembedindicators.Itisdifficultto
predict whether use of or attention to these reminders
woulddeclinewhenincentivesareremoved,butitcould
be argued that attention would shift and performance
levels would decline faster within a system where
personal income was attached to newly introduced
indicatorsthanremovedindicatorssuchasintheQual-
ity and Outcomes Framework.
While the data for each indicator suggest a general
upward trend over time for incentivised indicators, no
data are available for comparison from practices that
are not incentivised that would allow distinction of
effects due to underlying trends and secular influences
such as publicity.
Comparison with other studies
Previous work has focused on the effects of the pre-
sence rather than the removal of financial incentives.
Whilesomestudieshavefounda“haloeffect”inwhich
the quality of care can improve beyond the targeted
indicators to other indicators within a given condition
and perhaps to other conditions,
11 others have found
nosucheffect.
4Indeed,onestudyfoundthat qualityof
care within a given condition not associated with a
financial incentive declined for patients with asthma
or with heart disease.
12 It is possible that the effect of
removing indicators is similarly complex with, for
example, the effect of removing indicators where
there is no associated financial incentive being differ-
ent from removing one where there is an associated
financial loss. In a non-health context, one study
showed that if people are paid to do something they
would otherwise have done out of interest (such as a
clinical task that improved the quality of patient care),
they would be less likely to do so in future without
being paid.
13 The study also adds weight to the asser-
tion by another study
14 that the absence of financial
incentiveswithinpreviousqualityimprovementstrate-
gies may have partially explained the failure of such
strategies to lead to actual improvements in quality of
care.
Conclusions and policy implications
If the findings of this study are confirmed across a
wider range of indicators, clinicians need to be aware
thatiffinancialincentivesareremoved,theirfocusmay
change and they may need to think proactively about
how to maintain previous levels of patient care. It
could, however, also be argued that slightly lower
levels of achievement in one area may be more than
offset by improvements in care in a different clinical
area to which incentives are shifted. Policy makers
who intend to remove financially incentivised clinical
indicatorsmayneedtoconsiderastepwisereductionof
payments against indicators, rather than blanket
removal. They may also need to introduce a system
of monitoring achievement in areas where indicators
have been removed, as Kaiser Permanente Northern
California has, and perhaps decide a priori the level of
decline in achievement that could trigger a review and
possible reintroduction.
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